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AGT-08 · Agent governance & permissioning

Agents often run under a shared service principal with broad roles, so nobody can say what the agent may do until after it has done something wrong. Permission changes happen by ticket without review, and there is no tested kill switch when an agent acts outside its scope.

  • Who reads it: Agent leads, Responsible AI officers, security engineers and DevOps engineers who own agent identities
  • Outcome: Every agent has a written, enforced and tested permission envelope
  • Pack owner: Prasanna (catalog owner role: Responsible AI Officer)

Master catalog entry

  • Catalog name: Agent Governance & Permissioning Framework (P1)
  • Why it matters: Answers the board-level question of what the agent is allowed to do
  • What it removes: Blast-radius controls defined before build, not after an incident
  • Stack: Entra ID, managed identity, policy engine, action allow-lists
  • Maturity target: Level 2 — scope, spend, action and data-access boundaries

Playbooks

ID Story Title Kind Complexity Urgency Status Owner Planned publish
PB-AGT-08-01 AGT-08-S1 Define an agent's permission envelope: scope, spend, actions and data Decision guide Medium 3 draft Prasanna 2026-11-27
PB-AGT-08-02 AGT-08-S2 Enforce action allow-lists and approval gates in agent code How-to Medium 4 draft Devadharshini Raja 2026-11-25
PB-AGT-08-03 AGT-08-S3 Change an agent's permissions safely Runbook Medium 4 draft Prasanna 2026-11-13
PB-AGT-08-04 AGT-08-S4 Respond to an agent acting outside its permission envelope Runbook High 5 draft Prasanna 2026-11-11
PB-AGT-08-05 AGT-08-S5 Agent governance go-live review checklist Checklist Low 3 draft Devadharshini Raja 2026-12-02